Bank receivership and conservatorship by Walker F. Todd
eCONOMIG
COMMeNTORY
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
October 1,1994
Bank Receivership and Conservatorship
by Walker F.Todd
"efining physiological life and death
used to be comparatively easy. Under
broad definitions, living mammals were
considered capable of growth and repro-
duction and exhibited a variety of vital
signs such as positive blood pressure and
respiration. Dead mammals lacked these
capacities and gradually lost vital signs
as death progressed.
In this century, however, such simple
distinctions have become vastly more
complicated. In some systems of moral
philosophy, human life has been held to
begin long before live birth. At the other
extreme, the prolonging of life by artifi-
cial means has led to new concepts like
"brain death" to replace prior definitions
of death. An organic structure can
endure now, for a time at least, even
after vital functions have ceased.
Legal and economic distinctions regard-
ing the viability of depository institu-
tions also have become increasingly
complicated in this century, with most of
the relevant changes concentrated in the
last 25 years. It is now difficult to
describe with sufficient precision how to
characterize a depository institution as a
going concern—mat is, one capable of
satisfying its obligations as they mature.
Commercial bank supervisors have been
faced with the blending of legal and eco-
nomic concepts regarding failure resolu-
tion into new, hybrid forms.
Confining the analysis to commercial
banks, the standard definition of the term
"banks" contemplates a set of institu-
tions authorized both to accept demand
deposits and to make commercial loans.
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Following this standard legal definition,
failed or failing banks that are no longer
viable as going concerns should lack
either or both of the deposit-taking and
loan-making powers. Before 1933, this
generally was true. But the standard
forms of supervisory intervention that
have evolved since then have increas-
ingly blurred this distinction between
living and dead banks.
This Economic Commentary examines
the changing treatment of troubled insti-
tutions in the U.S. banking structure, with
particular focus on changes since 1987
affecting receiverships, conservatorships,
and bridge banks. Some of those changes,
including depositor preference legislation
enacted in 1993, have had unintended
consequences whose overall effects are
still somewhat uncertain.
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• Background before 1933
The concept of a receiver for failing
banks is derived from practices in bank-
ruptcy or other insolvency proceedings
even before the advent of a permanent
bankruptcy code in the United States in
1898. A receiver is appointed to take
over the assets and liabilities of an insti-
tution that has failed or has lost its bank-
ing charter in order to quickly and effi-
ciently dispose of that institution—in
essence, to wind up its affairs.
In the past quarter century, legal and
economic distinctions surrounding the
viability of depository institutions
have become increasingly blurred.
Changes enacted since 1987 have
made U particularly difficult for the
casual observer to detect differences
among the three forms of insolvency
resolution: receiverships, conservator-
ships, and bridge banks. This article
provides a history of regulatory and
statutory responses to failing banks,
with special focus on recent changes,
including depositor preference legisla-
tion, that have had unintended and
still-uncertain consequences.In pre-Civil War banking, bank charters
had limited terms (usually 20 years), so
states would appoint a receiver to wind
up the affairs of a bank whose charter
was not renewed, or which had forfeited
its charter prior to expiration. Judicially
accountable receivers were created vol-
untarily by a vote of the partners, share-
holders, or other owners of a bank to ter-
minate their responsibility for the bank's
liabilities or to make an equitable distri-
bution of its remaining assets. Bank in-
solvencies generally were treated no
differently under state law than the insol-
vencies of commercial enterprises, with
the exception of particular protections
for holders of failed banks' circulating
currency notes. Unpaid depositors usu-
ally had no better rights in the liquida-
tion of a failed bank man did other gen-
eral creditors, and banks usually were
prohibited from giving security for de-
posits, other man deposits of public
funds.
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Later, involuntary receivership for banks
became embodied in federal law in Sec-
tion SO of the National Bank Act of
1864, which provided as follows:
[O]n becoming satisfied... that any
association [national bank] has re-
fused to pay its circulating notes...,
and is in default, the Comptroller of
the Currency may forthwith appoint
a receiver... who, under the direc-
tion of the Comptroller, shall take
possession of the books, records, and
assets of every description of such
association, collect all debts, dues,
and claims belonging to such associ-
ation, and, upon the order of a court
of record of competent jurisdiction,
may sell or compound all bad or
doubtful debts, and ... sell all the
real and personal property of such
association... [and pay over the pro-
ceeds to the Comptroller's order].
And from time to time the Comptrol-
ler... shall make a ratable dividend
of the money so paid over to him by
such receiver on all such claims as
may have been proved to his satisfac-
tion or adjudicated in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction
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Thus, under applicable federal law, the
potentially incomplete repayment of
depositors' and other general creditors'
claims was a concept embedded within
the appointment of a receiver for a
national bank.
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Prior to 1933, receiverships under state
law, for state-chartered banks, were by
no means administered in accordance
with national bank receivership princi-
ples. As late as 189S, for example, the
Comptroller of the Currency reported to
Congress, "In nearly all of the states
insolvent banks are managed in the same
manner as other insolvent concerns."
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Only California provided for supervision
of the liquidation of insolvent state
banks by the state bank supervisory
authority. Thus, insolvency, a concept
that included but was more than mere
failure to repay depositors or general
creditors, was the principal determinant
of the fate of a failing bank or other busi-
ness, whose owners turned to voluntary
receivership to limit their liability to
depositors and general creditors.
Between the Civil War and the end of
World War I, many new banks were cre-
ated. Active U.S. banks numbered 8,030
in 1897 and 29,417 by 1921, but more
than 12,000 of them failed between 1921
and year-end 1933, focusing renewed
attention on the legal and institutional
structures of bank receiverships.
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1933, as an alternative to receiverships,
conservatorships for national banks were
created under Title II of the Emergency
Banking Act of March 9,1933.
8 The
condition then provided for appointment
of a conservator "whenever the Comp-
troller shall deem it necessary in order to
conserve the assets of any bank for the
benefit of the depositors and other credi-
tors thereof..." (former 12 U.S.C. Section
203). In other words, no explicit finding
of actual or potential insolvency or exist-
ing violation of the National Bank Act
was required—findings that would have
been required for the appointment of a
receiver. However, that former version
of the national bank conservatorship
statute provided explicitly that a conser-
vator was to have all the powers of a
receiver, in addition to powers necessary
to operate the failing bank. The principal
significance of the 1933 conservatorship
statute for our purposes is that it estab-
lished a new regime allowing a receiver-
like entity to take control of a national
bank's affairs involuntarily and for the
explicit purpose of protecting depositors
and general creditors.
Jesse Jones, the chairman of the former
Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
wrote that in drafting me conservator-
ship statute, the Hoover Administration
and involved Federal Reserve officials
believed that the title conservator was
"akin to receiver but less harsh on the
public ear," adding that the original
object of conservatorship was "to stave
off creditors long enough to rehabilitate
a bank rather than let it go into receiver-
ship."
9 Thus, the first blurring of the
distinctions between living and dead or
dying banks was introduced into federal
banking law in 1933.
An important provision of this statute
required conservators to segregate new
deposits (those received after appoint-
ment) from previously existing deposits,
to make such prior deposits available for
withdrawal only on a ratable basis
(which could be estimated), and not to
use new deposits to liquidate any indebt-
edness of the bank existing prior to
appointment
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0 This provision enabled
the conservator to satisfy old claims only
insofar as they would have been satisfied
in receivership, while still preserving the
option of handing over the entire bank to
new ownership (or even returning the
bank to the former management) with a
body of protected new deposits intact
The investments for which a conservator
could use new deposits were limited to
safe assets like government securities. In
the low-interest-rate environment of
1933, the asset values backing new
deposits in conservatorships were not
expected to fall below par, while the rat-
able distributions to prior depositors
could have required substantial dis-
counts from par values due to impaired
creditworthiness." In any case, while
about 1,100 conservatorships were cre-
ated for national banks during 1933, they
were rare afterward until the 1980s.
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2• Regulatory and Statutory
Responses to the 1980s Crises
The decline of federal deposit insurance
funds for the thrift and commercial
banking industries in the 1980s was the
first occasion since the 1930s for a crisis-
related review of receivership and con-
servatorship structures. Confronting
large-scale but officially unrecognized
insolvency in the thrift industry in the
Congress initially attempted to avoid
creating large numbers of conservator-
ships and receiverships. Instead, they
responded by allowing regulatory
accounting principles that diverged
widely from generally accepted account-
ing principles and by issuing Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
certificates that generated positive net
worth under regulatory accounting.
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After the failure of Continental Illinois
Corporation and its banking subsidiary
in 1984 and the demise of several large
southwestern banks after 1986, federal
bank regulators began to explore ways to
enable failing banks to continue to offer
banking services without having to




banks and, after 1987, mutual savings
banks, the first new device for this pur-
pose was bridge banks.
Bridge banks share many common
attributes with and serve many of the
same economic objectives as national
bank conservatorships, but are more
amorphous. Because bridge banks pro-
vide no segregation of post-organization
deposits or "safe bank" restrictions on
the investment of those deposits, an
accounting and legal nightmare can
ensue if these banks are not sold or
recapitalized as going concerns. The
principal difference in legal authority is
that bridge banks are organized and
administered by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), while the
Comptroller of the Currency appoints
national bank conservators.
In effect, a bridge bank is a hybrid cre-
ation that enables the FDIC to take over
and maintain ongoing banking services
at failing banks, including the commin-
gling of post-organization with pre-
organization deposits, even though the
FDIC does not issue bank charters.
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This additional power is important to
the FDIC because before 1987, it had
no statutory way to induce state regula-
tors to close failing state-chartered




bridge banks created since 1987 include
First Republic (1988) and M Corp
(1989), both in Texas, and Bank of New
England (1991).
Bridge banks may create moral dilem-
mas regarding the distinctions between
living and dead banks because a bridge
bank has many of the attributes of a liv-
ing institution: It may accept new depos-
its and make new loans, commingling
them with existing accounts; it is deemed
a new, insured national bank from the
time it is chartered; it may exercise all
the corporate powers of a national bank;
it may exist for up to two years, subject
to renewals for up to three additional
one-year terms; and it is explicitly en-




also shares many characteristics with
dying or dead institutions: It is created in
a manner analogous to that of a conser-
vatorship or receivership; it is in default
for the legal purpose of abridging certain
contractual obligations of the former
bank; it operates without capital and
need not observe normal capital ade-
quacy requirements; the FDIC exercises
close control over its asset and liability
powers; and it exists only for a limited
term, with the appointment of a receiver
required if the bank is not merged, sold,
or otherwise disposed of during that
term.
1
8 Legally, a bridge bank is like
a new national bank, but it serves the
economic function of an improperly
operated conservatorship because of the
commingling of deposits.
Some significant revisions of the na-
tional bank conservatorship statute were
enacted by the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA). The most im-
portant change for the purposes of this
article was that the formerly explicit
statutory requirement that new deposits
be segregated from pre-appointment de-
posits was dropped in favor of new lan-
guage providing that the Comptroller of
the Currency may require any conser-
vator to set aside amounts that can be




the Comptroller still might require a
conservator to segregate new from old
deposits, in the conservatorships cre-
ated for banks and thrifts since enact-
ment of FIRREA, new deposits have
not been so divided.
As with bridge banks, post-FIRREA
conservatorships create moral dilemmas
regarding the status of a conservatorship
as a living or dead institution: The
absence of the segregation of deposits
(formerly a hallmark of conservator-
ships) and the indefiniteness of the dura-
tion of a conservatorship may convey
the impression mat no useful distinction
can be drawn between conservatorships
and ordinary banks. At the same time,
this blurring of distinctions may serve to
maintain public confidence in the viabil-
ity of the overall banking system in
regions where a comparatively large





The enactment of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA) and one subse-
quent statutory revision have made some
potentially significant changes in bank
insolvency resolution procedures. Criti-
cally undercapitalized institutions must
be placed into conservatorship or re-
ceivership within 90 days, unless the
appropriate supervisory agency grants
an extension that may be renewed only
once.
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1 In that sense, the moral dilemma
of distinguishing between living and dy-
ing banks should eventually be resolved.Under FDICIA, the standards for ap-
pointment of conservators of national
banks were unified with those for ap-
pointment of the FDIC as conservator
of insured state-chartered banks; previ-
ously, appointment of the FDIC as con-
servator of state banks was a matter
entirely governed by state (not federal)
law. The principal new feature of the
revised standards is an explicit recog-
nition of a balance-sheet test (an excess
of noncapital liabilities over assets) as
sufficient grounds; previously, only a
going-concern (ability to satisfy matur-
ing claims) test was used.
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FDICIA also modified the receivership
section of the National Bank Act (now
12 U.S.C. Section 191) to provide for
appointment of the FDIC as receiver of
national banks without prior notice or
hearings on the same unified grounds
as for its appointment as conservator,
including explicit recognition of a
balance-sheet test of insolvency. The
Comptroller of the Currency is now
authorized to appoint a receiver even
without a prior examination of the
failed bank. These changes should
have the effect of reducing any public
confusion about the status of banks not
yet in receivership: If a bank is really
dead on a balance-sheet basis, there is
no longer any reason for supervisory
forbearance based on its lingering
capacity to satisfy maturing claims.
Finally, on August 10 of last year, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993 was enacted. Among other
things, it amended Section 11 (dXl 1)
of the FDIC Act (12 U.S.C. Section
1821 [d][ 11 ]) to establish a revised set
of priorities for payment of claims
(other than secured claims) by
receivers of failed depository institu-
tions. The new priorities are (a) admin-
istrative expenses of the receiver, (b)
any deposit liability of the institution;
(c) general or senior liabilities of the
institution; (d) subordinated obliga-
tions; and (e) shareholder claims.
The principal change from the previous
list of priorities is that depositors'
claims (to which the FDIC as receiver
would succeed) were advanced from the
same level as general and senior liabili-
ties to a preferential class of their own,
following only the receiver's adminis-
trative expenses. In order to prevent the
FDIC from increasing its share of the
receivership estate, general creditors
probably will attempt to take increased
amounts of collateral from failing insti-
tutions in order to become secured
claimants and (hereby avoid subordina-
tion to the new depositors' preference.
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The probable effect of federal depositor
preference legislation should be to
reduce depositors' confusion about the
status of their claims (it appears that
many of them believed that they already
had such a preference under federal law,
even though that was not so before
1993), at the expense of the possibly
increased confusion of general creditors.
• Conclusion
Since 1989, it has become increasingly
difficult for casual observers to make
useful functional distinctions among
receiverships, conservatorships, and
bridge bank administrations for failing
or failed banks and thrifts. Also, legal
distinctions among those three forms
of insolvency resolution that were
fairly sharp before 1987 have become
blurred. Under federal law, since 1991,
the standards for appointment of a
receiver or a conservator have been
unified, and since 1987 (bridge banks)
and 1989 (conservatorships), previous
legal barriers to the commingling of
pre-insolvency and post-insolvency
deposits have been removed.
The economic effect of failure to segre-
gate deposits in an insolvent or prospec-
tively insolvent institution is to spread
the cost of repaying uninsured claims
across all flinders of the federal safety
net instead of limiting these recoveries
to the estimated amounts to be realized
from the eventual liquidation of conser-
vatorship or bridge bank assets. In
effect, this condition gives uninsured
depositors time to flee but also, together
with the new depositor preference legis-
lation, reduces their incentives to flee.
The failure to segregate deposits effec-
tively creates an accounting pyramid
scheme in which the existing shortfall
between historic cost (book value) and
current market values of assets is
merely rolled forward into the new asset
pool supporting the mixture of bom old
and new deposits.
The original federal policy intention
regarding receiverships and conservator-
ships could be restored without modifi-
cation of the new depositor preference
statute if the relevant sections of the
FDIC Act and the National Bank Act
were amended to provide for the manda-
tory segregation of pre-appointment
from post-appointment accounts and to
prohibit the use of post-appointment
deposits to satisfy pre-appointment
claims in conservatorships and bridge
banks. The pre-1989 language of 12
U.S.C. Section 206 would be adequate
for such a purpose.
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